Prosecutors in New Taipei have indicted 10 people on charges of reselling export-controlled U.S. chips to China and Hong Kong after disguising where the parts came from, the Taipei Times reported. Prosecutors allege the group falsely claimed to be buying the chips for Taiwan's main military research institute and earned about NT$360 million, roughly $11.33 million, in illicit profit.
What Happened
According to the New Taipei District Prosecutors' Office, Chen Chien-hsiung, head of Lypid Taiwan Co, and others forged documents starting in 2017 and posed as representatives of the National Chung-shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), the government's defense research body. Using that cover, they allegedly bought controlled military-use chips made by Texas Instruments and Analog Devices from distributors in Taiwan.
Investigators say the group then repackaged the chips, changed their model numbers and declared them as made in Taiwan and not subject to controls before shipping them to China and Hong Kong. The parts originated in the U.S., the Philippines, Malaysia, South Korea and elsewhere, and prosecutors said they can be used in radar, electronic systems, ultrasound equipment, antenna arrays and drones.
The defendants include Chen's younger brother, a former head of Lypid Taiwan, as well as the heads of Stone Engine Technology, WTG Technology, KPlus Technology, HGT Application, EcoLumina Technologies and ZKey Technology. They face charges of aggravated fraud, document forgery and money laundering. Prosecutors are seeking sentences of one to 10 years, with the maximum for Chen.
The Taipei Times also described two related operations. A separate group led by Lai Chin-lan allegedly used similar methods to sell chips certified to a U.S. military specification to Hong Kong, earning about NT$130 million. Another suspect, Yuan Tung-tai, allegedly made more than NT$100 million selling chips with drone applications.
Why It Matters
Prosecutors said the scheme helped China strengthen its military, harmed Taiwan's national security and damaged the island's international reputation.
The method targets a weak point in export controls. Distributors of controlled components rely heavily on end-user statements to decide whether a sale is allowed, and NCSIST is a legitimate, authorized buyer of such parts. Forging its paperwork let the group obtain chips that would otherwise be refused, and relabeling them as Taiwanese, non-controlled goods was meant to get them past customs checks on the way out.
The chips in question are not the advanced AI processors at the center of the U.S.-China technology dispute, but military-use components from Texas Instruments and Analog Devices, two U.S. suppliers whose parts are widely used in defense electronics. U.S. export rules restrict sales of such military-grade components to China, and diversion through third places such as Hong Kong has long been a concern for U.S. enforcement agencies.
Context
The indictment adds to a run of Taiwanese cases tied to Chinese access to sensitive technology. Authorities in Taiwan have in recent years pursued Chinese chip firms operating offices on the island without approval and prosecuted cases involving alleged theft of trade secrets from TSMC, the island's largest chipmaker.
What to Watch
The case now moves to the courts, where judges will weigh the requested sentences. Other indicators are whether Taiwanese distributors tighten verification of end-user documents for controlled parts, and whether Texas Instruments, Analog Devices or U.S. authorities respond to the alleged diversion of their products.
TECHNOLOGY · AI · CYBERSECURITY · THE SYSTEMS SHAPING BUSINESS