Attackers took control of remote-access consoles at no fewer than six managed service providers (MSPs), the companies that run IT for other businesses, and used them Wednesday to push rogue software onto computers at dozens of client organizations, BleepingComputer reported, citing security firm Huntress. It shows how one weak link in a provider's toolkit can open a path into every customer it serves.

What Happened

Huntress said it first saw suspicious activity Wednesday afternoon on computers managed through several ScreenConnect environments. ScreenConnect, made by ConnectWise, is software that lets technicians control computers from afar. Within about 90 minutes, at least 288 managed computers across 48 organizations had been hit, roughly a third of them in the first 10 minutes, Huntress said in a research post. Those counts cover only Huntress's own customers, and the company told BleepingComputer the numbers were climbing.

The attackers used ScreenConnect's remote-command feature, which can run instructions on many machines at once, to install a second ScreenConnect client under their own control, BleepingComputer reported. Huntress said it arrived with a 16-file toolkit it calls SCKit, which tells Microsoft Defender antivirus to ignore its files, quietly takes over the legitimate client's connection so the machine looks normal, and sets itself to restart automatically.

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The kit is also built to spread on its own: it waits for a technician to connect to an infected machine, tries to infect the technician's computer, steals the technician's signed-in session from the browser and pushes itself to other machines that technician can reach. Huntress said it had not seen that jump succeed, and that attempts to take over the management console failed in every computer log it had checked so far.

Huntress said it saw no new software vulnerability and that its telemetry points to compromised credentials or hijacked technician sessions, BleepingComputer reported.

ConnectWise said in a security advisory Wednesday evening that it had found no compromise of its own infrastructure and, "at this time," no vulnerability in ScreenConnect itself. It suspects the attacker installed additional remote-access software through independent third-party add-ons, including RMM+, that partners may have added, and said the attacks remain under investigation. It disabled five such add-ons in about 400 cloud-hosted partner environments and told partners running ScreenConnect on their own servers to disable them manually. Having one installed does not mean a partner was breached, ConnectWise said. No attacker has been named.

Why It Matters

Outsourcing IT does not outsource the risk. An MSP's remote-access console works like a master key: whoever controls it can run commands on every client computer it manages. Whether the attackers got in through stolen logins, hijacked sessions or the add-ons themselves has not been established.

ConnectWise also warned that disabling the add-ons does not remove software, persistence or access already planted. Cleanup falls to each MSP and, in practice, its clients. Huntress said some machines were reinfected soon after being released from isolation.

Context

The Primary Wire reported Tuesday that N-able, a ConnectWise rival, pulled its hosted N-central platform offline after a researcher published attack code for more than 30 flaws. Huntress said it responded to similar worm-like activity involving rogue ScreenConnect clients in September, after which ConnectWise fixed a critical file-transfer flaw. Huntress did not say that flaw played a role this time.

What to Watch

ConnectWise said its investigation continues. Huntress told BleepingComputer that labels the attackers attached to each victim run in sequence, suggesting other MSPs may have been hit earlier, so providers should review their command history even without alerts.

Both companies urge MSPs to confirm the five add-ons are disabled and stay off; review remote-command and shared-file history for mass activity no one started; look for a second, unfamiliar ScreenConnect client on managed machines; and investigate suspect machines with separate tools, not through ScreenConnect, which could spread the infection. Huntress also advises ending active ScreenConnect sessions and changing credentials. Clients should ask their provider whether it ran these add-ons and what it has checked.