An attacker used 4,837 compromised GitHub accounts this week to slip credential-stealing code into the automated build systems of software projects, taking cloud keys and other secrets from at least 1,835 repositories, BleepingComputer reported Thursday, citing research by security vendor Aikido. Because those build systems often hold the keys to a company's cloud accounts and software releases, a stolen developer login can quietly become a stolen cloud environment.
What Happened
Aikido, which named the campaign "wfx-loot," said it began Tuesday. Using the compromised accounts, the attacker opened harmless-looking pull requests, which are proposed code changes, labeled as documentation notes in 61,764 repositories. Those requests did nothing on their own; they tested whether each account could change the project. About 92% were still open when Aikido published, which the company read as a sign that most owners had not noticed.
Where the account had write access, the attacker altered or added a GitHub Actions workflow, the scripts GitHub runs automatically to build and test code, or planted a hook that runs when a developer installs the project's dependencies. That delivered a roughly 1,500-line program that gathers GitHub tokens, cloud credentials for Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud, and keys for AI services, BleepingComputer reported. It can also trade the short-lived identity tokens GitHub gives workflows for live cloud sessions and, in Amazon's cloud, create long-lasting access keys. The attacker then reverted the changes and deleted the workflow's run records and logs, reportedly in under a minute.
StepSecurity, another security firm, said the attacker "does not exploit a bug in GitHub Actions," SecurityWeek reported; it used valid tokens belonging to developer and bot accounts. StepSecurity traced 173 of the probes to tokens issued to the Fly.io GitHub app but could not say how they were obtained and had no evidence that Fly.io's infrastructure was breached. SafeDep, a third firm, counted 8,093 public repositories that received malicious commits, though not all of them necessarily ran the code, according to SecurityWeek.
BleepingComputer reported that some of the compromised accounts belonged to Fortune 100 companies, the U.S. General Services Administration, the French government, Nextcloud and WebdriverIO. Aikido's research and SecurityWeek's report do not name affected organizations, and none of the organizations had publicly confirmed it in the coverage. Neither outlet reported a statement from GitHub.
Why It Matters
CI/CD pipelines, short for continuous integration and continuous delivery, build, test and ship software each time developers make a change. To do that, they hold secrets: passwords, tokens and keys that let them reach cloud accounts, databases and package registries. This campaign went straight for that store of access, and its cleanup means the usual audit trail may be gone.
For boards and executives, the exposure is not limited to the companies whose accounts were taken over. Any organization whose developers or automation bots can write to an affected project may have lost credentials without seeing an alert. Aikido advises that wherever the code ran, every secret and cloud role available to that pipeline should be treated as compromised.
The risk can also travel downstream. Aikido said at least 50 of the compromised users appear to publish packages to major open-source registries, and the payload reached one PHP package and versions of a Go module, though it judged credential theft, not poisoning software, to be the main goal. The Primary Wire reported in September on an earlier case in which tainted GitHub workflows were built to harvest the same kind of pipeline secrets.
What Engineering Leaders Should Check
Security teams should look for unexpected pull requests, branches and commits in repositories their accounts could write to since Nov. 10, and for gaps in the numbering of workflow runs, which Aikido said is often the only trace left. Where the code ran, they should revoke and rotate all secrets, and review cloud accounts for new access keys, changed trust settings or other unauthorized changes.
What to Watch
Whether GitHub comments or acts against the campaign, whether the organizations BleepingComputer named confirm any exposure, and how the attacker obtained the GitHub tokens in the first place. Aikido said the activity overlaps with an earlier campaign known as GhostAction but is likely the work of a different actor.