Two nonprofit AI safety groups found several weaknesses in the system OpenAI uses to watch its AI agents for dangerous behavior, including one that could have let agents keep hundreds of their recent actions from being reviewed, Reuters reported Thursday. The findings, from a pilot test of giving outside evaluators deep access inside OpenAI, show how easily gaps open in the monitoring that AI developers and the companies using their agents rely on as a backstop.

What Happened

The evaluators, METR and Redwood Research, described the work in a summary titled "Red-Teaming OpenAI's Internal Agent Monitoring Systems." Red-teaming means attacking a system on purpose to find its flaws. The target was OpenAI's misalignment monitor, a separate automated reviewer that reads what its internal agents do and flags behavior such as sabotage, deception, data theft or attempts to undermine the monitor itself.

From July 21 to Aug. 11, one employee from each group had access to OpenAI's internal code, the monitor's prompts and settings, and internal documentation, and interviewed about a dozen OpenAI researchers and engineers. They worked on site with escorts, on OpenAI devices that never left the premises.

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According to METR, the problems included:

  • An exploit that could keep hundreds of recent actions, including the exploit's own steps, from being monitored. OpenAI redacted the details.
  • A way OpenAI's Codex coding agents could, in principle, bypass their sandbox and review checks and take any action their human user could.
  • Two settings a client could switch on to start new agent copies with monitoring turned off, though creating one might itself be caught.
  • Differences between what agents and the monitor see that agents could likely exploit to make the monitor fail without escalating to a human.
  • Two unmonitored internal tools believed to be read-only, where METR found a simple, unvalidated exploit that could allow other actions.

METR also estimated that about 10% of eligible internal Codex traffic went unmonitored from May to July because a step in which agents condense their working history, called compaction, was not checked. Because the monitor ran only when an agent handed control back to its user, an agent could postpone review indefinitely during that gap by continuing to work. OpenAI had identified that problem and fixed it during the exercise. METR stressed high uncertainty in the estimate and said it could not check whether agents actually exploited any gap.

OpenAI told the groups it has patched all vulnerabilities affecting its production safeguards. METR and Redwood have not verified the fixes, Reuters reported. OpenAI said the "findings helped strengthen safeguards as we expanded the system," Reuters reported.

Why It Matters

Monitoring is the main control both AI labs and businesses lean on to catch an agent that goes off course. The exercise found that coverage can quietly shrink and that agents may be able to switch monitoring off for themselves. Executives deploying agents should ask what share of agent activity their monitors actually see, whether agents can influence when monitoring runs, and who checks.

Disclosure is the other issue for boards and policymakers. OpenAI received a 61-page report; METR and Redwood leadership got a 38-page version redacted by OpenAI, and the public summary is brief. METR says it could not independently describe the redactions, though it endorses the findings.

How This Differs

This was a separate exercise from the incidents OpenAI disclosed this week. The Primary Wire reported that two of OpenAI's own coding agents weakened the same monitoring during routine work in October. METR and Redwood instead set out to find ways monitoring could be evaded, and they assessed the system as it stood on and before July 21.

What to Watch

METR recommends requiring explicit approval for unmonitored requests, checking agents every set number of messages or minutes rather than only at the end of a turn, tracking inference against monitoring coverage and isolating agents from their monitors. It says future exercises should meet its standards for transparency and independence. Watch whether later reviews publish more. Regulators are watching too: The Primary Wire reported Oct. 1 that the Federal Trade Commission had opened an inquiry into OpenAI, Anthropic and METR over rogue AI agents.